Segundo matéria da Reuters, a Rússia deve instalar mísseis nucleares no enclave de Kaliningrado até 2019 como resposta à ativação do escudo antimísseis balísticos dos EUA na Europa. O posicionamento de mísseis armados com ogivas nucleares também pode ocorrer na Crimeia, território anexado pela Rússia em 2014.
Confira aqui a monografia do pesquisador do ISAPE, Osvaldo Alves Pereira Filho, sobre a conexão entre a intimidação nuclear e os processos de proliferação nuclear no Sistema Internacional, estudando o caso específico da China. Entre outros, o trabalho mostra que a intimidação nuclear foi o principal imperativo para Pequim iniciar o seu programa nuclear, e que o atual Escudo Antimíssil dos EUA no leste asiático tem levado a China a acelerar e aprofundar a sua modernização estratégica-nuclear. Portanto, o uso da intimidação nuclear aumentaria a percepção de ameaça nos atores do Sistema Internacional, gerando maior estímulo à proliferação.
Esta semana o sistema de defesa antimísseis da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN) entrou em operação na Europa oriental. Bases na Romênia e na Polônia foram ativadas nesta quinta (05/05) e sexta-feira (06/05), respectivamente. Fato, juntamente com a decisão de aumentar presença de tropas no leste europeu, evidencia uma nova postura da OTAN de enfrentamento com a Rússia. Moscou critica duramente o escudo antimísseis da aliança, pois, segundo o Kremlin, sua razão de ser — originalmente o Irã — já não existe após o acordo com Teerã e porque o sistema poderia ser usado de maneira ofensiva, para atacar território russo. O governo polonês suspeita que a Rússia responda à medida com o envio de mísseis nucleares ao enclave de Kaliningrado.
Na semana passada a China testou com sucesso o míssil hipersônico WU-14, conduzindo “manobras extremas” capazes de superar os sistemas antimísseis dos Estados Unidos. Esse foi o quarto teste do veículo de reentrada hipersônico, capaz de carregar ogivas nucleares e convencionais a uma velocidade 10 vezes mais rápida que o som (Mach 10 ou aproximadamente 12.360 km/h). A capacidade de realizar manobras a essa velocidade abre a pergunta se o sistema poderia ser usado como arma antinavios. Combinado com o novo míssil balístico intercontinental em desenvolvimento pela China, Pequim poderia atingir qualquer lugar no globo terrestre em menos de uma hora.
O Pentágono quer estender o alcance de um de seus sistemas interceptadores de mísseis projetados para abater alvos lançados pela Coreia do Norte e pelo Irã de modo que também possa alvejar mísseis super-rápidos da China e da Rússia no futuro. A empresa Lockheed Martin já estaria desenvolvendo em segredo um sistema de mísseis interceptadores de dois estágios ao invés de somente um como hoje em dia.
O presidente da Rússia, Vladimir Putin, aprovou nova doutrina militar para o país que considera como uma ameça a expansão da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN) e o fortalecimento militar da aliança próximo a suas fronteiras. Nova doutrina considera que tais ações violam o direito internacional e indicam que os Estados Unidos são responsáveis por essas medidas. Também há referência explícita à ameaça representada pelos novos sistemas antimísseis ocidentais que alterariam significativamente a balança de poder mundial.
Os Estados Unidos estão fortalecendo as suas capacidades de interceptação de mísseis balísticos em território japonês através do envio de novo radar para o país. Washington e Tóquio informaram que será um segundo sistema de radar móvel AN/TPY-2 produzido pela empresa Raytheon. Medida é vista com cautela e até mesmo oposição pela China e pela Rússia.
O Senado dos Estados Unidos aprovou o financiamento de 225 milhões de dólares para a compra de mísseis do sistema de defesa antimísseis de Israel, conhecido como “Iron Dome” (“cúpula de ferro”). Pedido israelense agora será discutido na Câmara, onde também deve ser facilmente aprovado.
Confira aqui como funciona o sistema de defesa antimísseis de Israel, conhecido como “Iron Dome” (“cúpula de ferro”).
Os Estados Unidos vão enviar mais dois destróieres com sistema antimíssil para o Japão até 2017, alegando maior necessidade de segurança com relação à Coreia do Norte, que recentemente testou mísseis balísticos.
Zachary Keck argumenta que, apesar dos bilhões de dólares e décadas de trabalho investidos, a defesa antimísseis produziu poucos resultados, e o futuro não parece ser promissor com o advento dos mísseis hipersônicos.
Israel testou com êxito o sistema Arrow III de interceptação de mísseis espaciais pela segunda vez. Sistema é atualização do atual escudo antimísseis do país.
Rússia confirmou ter enviado mísseis balísticos táticos do tipo Iskander-M para regiões próximas das suas fronteiras com Estados membros da OTAN. País teria capacidade de atingir alvos na Polônia, Lituânia, Ucrânia e Alemanha, entre outros.
Após acordo com Irã, é possível que EUA retire o país da lista de Estados párias. Medida erodiria a justificativa para a construção de um escudo antimísseis na Europa. Rússia já reconheceu o fato e pressiona para o cancelamento dos planos que vê como intromissão em sua esfera de influência.
Russia’s View of the Iran Deal and U.S. Plans for Central Europe
Stratfor – 26/11/2013
The landmark agreement the P-5+1 and Tehran reached over the weekend regarding the Iranian nuclear program is having effects beyond the immediate region. Speaking at a media forum in Rome on Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the deal obviates the need for NATO’s ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe, given that the system — championed by the United States — was designed to counter potential missile threats from Iran. Lavrov noted that if the deal is implemented as planned, then “the stated reason for the construction of the defense shield will no longer apply.”
NATO’s ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe have long been one of the most contentious issues between Moscow and Washington. These plans, known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach, involve placing interceptor bases in Romania and Poland that are capable of shooting down various-ranged ballistic missiles. These are set to become operational in 2015 and 2018, respectively. The groundbreaking ceremony at the site in Romania took place last month.
While the European Phased Adaptive Approach is technically and officially designed to counter missile attacks specifically from Iran, the plans have drawn substantial concern from Russia. Moscow considers any NATO-related military buildup in Europe a potential threat, and Russia fears that the technology used in the development of the ballistic missile defense system could one day challenge Russia’s intercontinental missile arsenal, which it relies on as its primary strategic deterrent. As the European Phased Adaptive Approach becomes more robust — currently it is not much of a direct threat to Moscow, based on capabilities and placement — it could seriously threaten Russia’s ballistic missile capabilities in the long term. For years, Russia has demanded legal guarantees from NATO and the United States that the system would not target its strategic nuclear deterrent. This issue has been a constant sticking point in talks between Moscow and the West over ballistic missile defense.
But there is a broader issue regarding ballistic missile defense that goes beyond the specifics of a system and legal guarantees: the battle between the United States and Russia for influence in Central Europe. Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been worried by what it sees as the West’s never-ending encroachment in its near abroad. The wave of NATO and EU expansion during the late 1990s and early 2000s occurred at a time when Russia was weak and came at great geopolitical cost to Moscow. Now Russia is stronger, but it still views any U.S.- or NATO-led military moves in Central and Eastern Europe through the same prism of interference, especially in what Russia deems as its sphere of influence. Russia thus views the ballistic missile defense system as an excuse for the United States to deploy military personnel in some of the most strategic borderland states of Europe.
For Russia to raise the ballistic missile defense issue again immediately after the Iranian nuclear deal reveals two things. The first is Russia’s more recent role in facilitating U.S. policy in the Middle East. This began with Russia developing a diplomatic resolution to the chemical weapons crisis in Syria and saving the United States from engaging in another unpopular military intervention in the region. The Syria resolution then opened the door for Iran and the United States to negotiate. Despite its reservations over a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, Russia knew it could do little to derail the process and calculated instead that its cooperation in the deal — as opposed to its obstruction — would give Russia substantial leverage in other more pressing issues with the United States. It is likely that NATO’s ballistic missile defense plans for Central Europe would be on the top of Moscow’s list of such issues.
The second revelation is the far-reaching consequences of the Iranian nuclear settlement. Not only does a potential U.S.-Iranian understanding lead to a realignment of the balance of power in the Middle East, but it also carries the potential for changes in a host of other regions, from Afghanistan to the Caucasus to Central Asia. The same could be said for Central Europe, considering how it intersects with U.S.-Russian negotiations that run parallel to U.S.-Iranian talks.
How the Iranian nuclear agreement will actually affect the European Phased Adaptive Approach remains to be seen. The agreement is still in its initial phase and is subject to numerous obstacles and complications over the coming months. There is a big difference between the United States’ conditional easing of certain sanctions on Iran and the official recognition that Iran no longer poses a military threat to the United States or its European allies. Moreover, Washington has been careful to reassure the Central European states that they are not being abandoned as a result of the Iran talks and accompanying negotiations with Russia. Earlier this month on a visit to Poland, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said the deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach would not be contingent on the Iran issue. So far, the United States has chosen to say little about ballistic missile defense, with mid-tier U.S. officials reiterating that the U.S. administration is willing to engage in dialogue with the Kremlin over the issue though not yet showing signs of backing away from the European Phased Adaptive Approach as part of a bargain with Moscow.
Russia can be expected to continue pushing the issue, however, making clear to the United States that the price for its continued cooperation in the Middle East is Washington’s tempering of its military aid for Central European countries. Russia will try to push the United States into a corner by exposing the eroding foundation of U.S. ballistic missile defense plans now that Iran is on the path to losing its pariah status. On the one hand, the weakening Iran pretext is making it difficult for the United States to justify the development of its ballistic missile defense strategy; on the other hand, the United States is not yet in a position to meaningfully challenge Russia in its near abroad through more direct forms of military assistance, especially while trying to tie up a number of loose ends in the Middle East. This state of limbo is exactly where Moscow wants Washington — with Poland, Romania, Ukraine and others watching and wondering whether they can still count on the United States for support when they need it most.
Mais uma vez a Rússia faz seus bombardeiros estratégicos sobrevoarem bem próximos do espaço aéreo japonês. Apesar das relações bilaterais estarem acentuadamente positivas, atitude pode ser vista como um descontentamento russo com o plano de escudo antimísseis global proposto pelos EUA a ser instalado no Japão.
Russia Flies Strategic Bombers Close to Japanese Airspace (Again)
The Diplomat – 19/11/2013 – por Ankit Panda
The Japanese Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) was placed on high alert and scrambled jets after two Russian long-range Tu-95 strategic bombers (comparable to American B-52s) flew the length of the Ryukyu Island chain on Sunday. According to Ria Novosti, the bombers did not violate Japanese airspace.
The Moscow Times, citing Japanese defense officials, further added that the two Tu-95s “flew northward along a group of islands near Okinawa Island in the direction Hokkaido.” The jets headed north toward Sakhalin Island. It further reported that the ASDF scrambled jets to respond to a Tu-142 long-range maritime reconnaissance anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft which also flew close to Japanese airspace.
The Japanese reaction to this sort of Russian activity has been observed for a while now. The ASDF has scrambled jets 105 times between July to September 2013 due to close-proximity Russian fly-bys.
Although the fly-by did not violate Japanese airspace during this particular incident, Russian jets have been known to do so in the past. Su-27 jets allegedly entered Japanese airspace earlier this year, marking the first time since 2008 that Russian jets entered Japanese airspace. A similar incident involving a pair of Tu-95 strategic bombers occurred in August of this year. Japan’s Defense Ministry is conducting an analysis into Russia’s intentions with these fly-bys.
The fly-by incidents cast a shadow over warming relations between Russia and Japan, who held a 2+2 joint consultation between their foreign and defense ministers. The talks, widely seen as successful, resulted in a commitment to comprehensively deepen ties in security matters. The two committed to develop their bilateral cooperation on maritime and cyber-security matters. Russia and Japan have also discussed the possibility of conducting joint military exercises.
Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida told a press conference after the 2+2 meeting: “To boost cooperation in the field of security, and not just in the field of economic and people exchanges, means that we are improving overall Japan-Russia ties.”
Earlier this year, in September, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin came to an understanding that the nearly 70-year old territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands should be resolved via a draw. According to Putin’s spokesman “Both sides expressed an understanding that the solution to the problem of the peace agreement can only be based on the principle that there are no victors or losers.”
Do these fly-bys relate directly to the Kuril Islands dispute? Probably not. Russian and Japanese relations are at all-time highs, and the fact that a very specific rapprochement has occurred between Putin and Abe should indicate that Russia is unlikely to take any military steps to resolve the dispute.
Alexander Golts, a military expert on Russia with Yezhednevny Zhurnal, agrees with that assessment saying that “There is absolutely no reason for anyone to want to make some sort of military demonstration to Japan at this point. They’ve been holding talks, and quite successful ones, about enhancing mutual security.” Golts adds that the most likely explanation is perhaps that it is a coincidence – a case of “The left hand doesn’t know what the right hand is doing.”
The latter explanation is largely unsatisfactory. Vladimir Putin’s handling of security affairs is hardly known to be ad hoc and coincidental.
The Russian Defense Ministry has repeatedly issued statements after these fly-bys stating that it conducts them under the principles of international law, without violating the airspace of other states.
An often-underdiscussed point in analyses of the increasing Russian fly-bys this year is growing Russian unease over burgeoning U.S. missile defense systems in Japan. Reflecting on the 2+2 meeting earlier this month, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said “We made no secret of the fact that the creation by the U.S. of a global missile defense system, including a Japanese element, is causing us grave concern, primarily over the possible destruction of the strategic balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.”
Moscow is expected to approach Tokyo more directly about the issue in future high-level talks. Japanese FM Kishida was remarkably clear about Japan’s commitment to its alliance with the United States. According to RT, he responded to Russian concerns by stating that “there will be no changes” with regard to its U.S. alliance. The fly-bys might communicate to Tokyo the true extent of Moscow’s concerns.
EUA e OTAN começaram a renovar uma base militar na Romênia que será parte crucial de um escudo antimísseis na Europa operado por estadunidenses, complicando as relações com a Rússia.
US, Romania break ground on missile defense system
RT – 28/10/2013
The US and NATO have begun revamping a military base in Romania which will be a crucial part of the American-led anti-missile shield in Europe. The NATO missile defense system remains a bone of contention in US-Russian relations.
Romanian President Trojan Basesku and US Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the Aegis Ashore missile defense system at Deveselu military base in southern Romania on Monday.
“Construction of the base in Deveselu, as noted by [US] Minister of Defense Chuck Hagel, has begun despite a lack of mutual understanding on the issue with Russia,” Romania’s Minister of Defense Mircea Dusa said.
Dusa said Romanian construction workers were first tasked with converting the former Air Force base, and then the US campaign to install the missile defense systems would begin.
Earlier this month, Pentagon spokesman George Little said the “system represents an important component of the larger European Phased Adaptive Approach and is expected to be operational in 2015.”
The issue of the US missile shield in Europe has been a longstanding bone of contention in Russia-US relations. Moscow has demanded legal guarantees from Washington that missile defense systems deployed in Europe would not target Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence capabilities. Washington has refused to grant Russia such assurances, citing a need to protect Europe from ‘rogue states’ like Iran and North Korea.
On Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov “missile defense remains a burning issue,” adding that Russia’s position is well-known.
“We are ready for a constructive dialogue with the US and NATO and are open to finding a compromise, but let’s not pretend that the incessant talks that there is nothing within the scheme of the American-led ABM that needs to be changed, nor that it’s not against Russia, that all this talk can somehow settle things,” Lavrov said.
Lavrov said Russia is interested in strengthening all aspects of strategic stability, regional stability the neutralization of threats through political and diplomatic means.
Earlier this month, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said there is yet to be mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and NATO on the issue of the missile defense program, as not all the security concerns of Russia are being taken into account by its partners.
A bilateral agreement to deploy missile interceptors inside Romania was signed at the Pentagon one day after the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The planned interceptors include the land-based SM-3 ballistic missile defense system.
Romania’s participation in the NATO missile defense system will constitute the second phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which initially consisted of four stages.
On September 17, 2009, however, US President Barack Obama announced that the planned deployment of long-range missile defense interceptors and equipment in Poland and the Czech Republic had been scrapped, and that defense against short- and medium-range missiles using AEGIS warships would be deployed instead.
The first part of this revised system – an early warning radar station in Malatya, Turkey – went operational in January 2012. Apart from Romania, other elements of the system will be built in Portugal, Poland, and Spain.