polaridade

A ascensão da China e os seus impactos para o leste asiático


Confira aqui a dissertação do pesquisador do ISAPE, Athos Munhoz Moreira da Silva, sobre a ascensão da China e os seus impactos para o leste asiático. Com base em uma análise histórica da ascensão chinesa, o trabalho trata da alteração fundamental na polaridade e na polarização regionais, com implicações em âmbito global. Constata-se que, diante da rivalidade estratégica entre Estados Unidos e China, os demais atores regionais buscam manter sua autonomia e margem de manobra entre as duas potências. Consideram-se três possíveis perspectivas para o leste asiático: uma hegemonia chinesa sem ocorrência de guerra central; o acirramento das tensões entre Pequim e Washington, com possibilidade de guerra central; e a concertação e criação de mecanismos de governança entre os atores regionais, podendo ser anárquica — sem líderes aparentes — ou hierárquica — condomínio de potências —.

Imagem: East by Southeast.

Anúncios

A polaridade sob a perspectiva dos conceitos operacionais: o caso do A2/AD e da Air-Sea Battle


Confira aqui a monografia do pesquisador do ISAPE, Guilherme Henrique Simionato dos Santos, sobre a relação entre os conceitos operacionais de Antiacesso e Negação de Área (A2/AD) e de Air-Sea Battle (ASB ou Batalha Aeronaval) e a polaridade no Sistema Internacional. Um dos fatores-chave para esta é a inexpugnabilidade, i.e. a capacidade de um país manter a sua soberania frente a qualquer agressão externa. O trabalho mostra que a inexpugnabilidade da China se dá através de seu processo de modernização militar focado no A2/AD, mas que, em contrapartida, os Estados Unidos desenvolveram a ASB, cujo objetivo é garantir o acesso estadunidense à região do Leste e Sudeste Asiático a despeito do A2/AD chinês. Dessa forma, a ASB seria uma estratégia não declarada de primazia, pois prega a destruição da rede de informações e de mísseis da China, negando a Pequim uma capacidade de retaliação.

Foto: Marinha dos EUA.

Um outro ponto de vista sobre ciberguerra


Ilustração por: FP / Francesco Bongiorni

 Think Again: Cyberwar

Foreign Policy / THOMAS RID – Março/Abril de 2012

“Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us.” No way. “Cyberwar is coming!” John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt predicted in a celebrated Rand paper back in 1993. Since then, it seems to have arrived — at least by the account of the U.S. military establishment, which is busy competing over who should get what share of the fight. Cyberspace is “a domain in which the Air Force flies and fights,” Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne claimed in 2006. By 2012, William J. Lynn III, the deputy defense secretary at the time, was writing that cyberwar is “just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space.” In January, the Defense Department vowed to equip the U.S. armed forces for “conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains — land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace.” Meanwhile, growing piles of books and articles explore the threats of cyberwarfare, cyberterrorism, and how to survive them.

Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we’ve seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don’t meet these criteria.

Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by cyberwar’s true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called “logic bomb” exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged the pipeline’s control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed, a U.S. National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004 book, At the Abyss; the only harm came to the Soviet economy.

But did it really happen? After Reed’s account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. Something likely did happen, but Reed’s book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a single document. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of Reed’s source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort to provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not confirm that such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn’t be counted as a proven case of a successful cyberattack. (mais…)