Confira aqui a dissertação do pesquisador do ISAPE, Alexandre Arns Gonzales, sobre como a expansão da Internet afeta as estruturas de poder nas relações internacionais. Utilizando a Teoria de Redes e uma análise de Sistema-Mundo, o trabalho mostra quais são os grupos de interesses que disputam e moldam as diferentes áreas de governanças da Internet e sua arquitetura e também como que as práticas reais da governança da Internet impactam as relações entre o centro e periferia das relações internacionais.
Confira aqui a análise de M. K. Bhadrakumar publicado no site Asia Times (24/11) sobre o pivô russo para o Irã. Ambos os países já afirmaram que possuem uma congruência em seus interesses, notadamente no apoio ao governo de Bashar al-Assad na Síria. Segundo o autor, a Rússia vê no Irã um ator central na estabilização do Oriente Médio.
Em artigo publicado na revista The Diplomat (24/11), Ankit Panda analisa o fracasso da aproximação do Afeganistão com o Paquistão e a recente aproximação estratégica de Cabul com a Índia. Nova Deli pode ser um importante parceiro dos afegãos na estabilização do país. Isso poderia beneficiar os Estados Unidos, que estenderam sua permanência em território afegão devido a novas insurgências.
Convidamos alunos de graduação e pós-graduação a realizarem o curso EAD “Espaço e Relações Internacionais”, oferecido pelo pesquisador associado do ISAPE, Dr. Marco Cepik, professor da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). O curso trata da importância do espaço sideral para as Relações Internacionais no século XXI. Serão estudadas as características básicas deste ambiente, a história da corrida espacial, as teorias que explicam o poder espacial, e os programas espaciais do Brasil, da China e da Índia. Ao final, destaca-se a inserção dos programas espaciais nas estratégias nacionais de desenvolvimento e de segurança dos países emergentes, sobretudo no contexto de uma ordem internacional em transição.
Estão abertas até o dia 01 de setembro de 2015 as inscrições para participar do concurso público para seleção de professor de Ensino Superior na UFRRJ, Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, do Departamento de História e Relações Internacionais na área de “Estudos de Segurança e Teoria das Relações Internacionais”. A vaga para docente exige formação mínima de mestre em qualquer área das Humanidades. As inscrições podem ser realizadas aqui.
Estão abertas até o dia 23 de julho de 2015 as inscrições para participar do concurso público para seleção de professor de Ensino Superior na UFSM, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, para a área de Relações Internacionais. Confira mais informações aqui.
Estão abertas as inscrições para participar do concurso público para seleção de professor de Ensino Superior na UNILA, Universidade Federal da Integração Latino Americana, para a área de Relações Internacionais e Integração, subárea de Economia Política Internacional e Integração Regional. Podem se candidatar acadêmicos a partir do nível de Mestrado. Inscrições podem ser feitas do dia 13 de maio a 7 de junho de 2015.
Cristina Pecequilo analisa as propostas de política externa de Dilma Rousseff e Aécio Neves e argumenta que a escolha entre um dos dois candidatos é também uma decisão sobre qual papel o País deve exercer no mundo. Dilma representa continuidade de uma inserção internacional autônoma e Aécio uma inflexão em direção à despolitização da política externa brasileira.
Na última terça-feira, dia 23 de setembro, ocorreu a visita dos representantes do Ministério da Defesa e do Comando Militar do Sul à Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas (FCE). O objetivo da visita teve como foco a preparação do “X Curso de Extensão em Defesa Nacional”. O Prof. Dr. Paulo Visentini, Coordenador do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais (PPGEEI/UFRGS), recebeu, em nome do Prof. Dr. Hélio Henkin, Diretor da FCE, e do próprio PPGEEI o Cel. Celso Bueno da Fonseca, Gerente da Divisão de Cooperação do Ministério da Defesa, e o Cel. Luiz Roberto Araújo Vignolo, Assessor de Planejamento do Comando Militar Sul.
Após a recepção, foi realizada uma reunião de trabalho da comissão organizadora do evento, composta por professores do PPGEEI, pelos representantes do Ministério da Defesa e do Comando Militar do Sul, pela coordenadora-geral do Centro Estudantil de Relações Internacionais (CERI), Ana Carolina Melos de Souza, e por alunos do PPGEEI e da graduação em Relações Internacionais. O “X Curso de Extensão em Defesa Nacional” é promovido pelo Ministério da Defesa, em parceria com a FCE, o PPGEEI, o CEGOV (Centro de Estudos Internacionais sobre o Governo) e o ISAPE (Instituto Sul-Americano de Política e Estratégia) e o CERI. O Curso representa mais uma etapa do esforço do Ministério, da FCE e do PPGEEI em popularizar o debate acerca da Defesa Nacional, o que se conforma com a perspectiva de que a participação da sociedade civil é imprescindível para a realização plena das diretrizes políticas na formulação securitária. O evento será realizado no auditório da Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas, na semana dos dias 20 a 24 de outubro, no turno da tarde (entre as 14:00 e as 18:00). Inscrições e maiores informações a respeito da programação do evento podem ser encontradas no link.
Parceiro do ISAPE, o UFRGS Model United Nations 2014 convida todos os interessados a fazerem o curso de extensão “Simulações como ferramentas de ensino e aprendizagem em Relações Internacionais” que ocorrerá entre abril e junho deste ano.
O curso serve como preparação para modelos da ONU e conta com palestras sobre Relações Internacionais contemporâneas, Sistema ONU, Direito Internacional e técnicas de negociação, entre outros.
Sempre aos sábados pela manhã na Faculdade de Direito da UFRGS, Av. João Pessoa n. 80.
As inscrições podem ser feitas por email (veja o cartaz) até o dia 6 de abril.
O investimento é de 60 reais para alunos da UFRGS e 70 para o público em geral, valendo certificado de 20 horas complementares.
Confiram o cartaz:
Estão abertas as inscrições para participar do concurso público para seleção de professores de Ensino Superior na UNILA, Universidade Federal da Integração Latino Americana, para a área de Relações Internacionais, subáreas de Teoria das Relações Internacionais e Integração Regional (2 vagas), Política Externa e Integração Regional na América Latina (1 vaga), Análise das Relações Internacionais Contemporâneas (1 vaga). A titulação mínima exigida é de doutorado em Relações Internacionais ou áreas afins (Ciência Política, Política Externa, Política Internacional, Economia, Geografia, História, Estudos Estratégicos, Sociologia, Ciências Sociais ou Ciências Humanas).
Maiores informações podem ser obtidas diretamente no site da UNILA, na página de concursos: http://unila.edu.br/conteudo/concursos no Edital de Condições Gerais, edital Progepe n. 1/2013, ou nos respectivos editais específicos listados a seguir :
- Área: Relações Internacionais – Subárea: Teoria das Relações Internacionais e Integração Regional (2 vagas)
Período de Inscrições: 25 de outubro a 10 de novembro de 2013. Inscreva-se aqui: http://inscreva.unila.edu.br/events/9/subscriptions/new
Edital de Abertura: http://unila.edu.br/sites/default/files/files/Edital%20PROGEPE%20053%202013%20-%20RI%20-%20Teoria%20das%20Rela%C3%A7%C3%B5es%20Internacionais%20e%20Integra%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20Regional.pdf
- Área: Relações Internacionais – Subárea: Política Externa e Integração Regional na América Latina
Período de Inscrições: 25 de outubro a 17 de novembro de 2013. Inscreva-se aqui: http://inscreva.unila.edu.br/events/11/subscriptions/new
Edital de Abertura: http://unila.edu.br/sites/default/files/files/Edital%20PROGEPE%20053%202013%20-%20RI%20-%20Teoria%20das%20Rela%C3%A7%C3%B5es%20Internacionais%20e%20Integra%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20Regional.pdf
- Área: Relações Internacionais – Subárea: Análise das Relações Internacionais Contemporâneas
Período de Inscrições: 28 de outubro a 24 de novembro de 2013. Inscreva-se aqui: http://inscreva.unila.edu.br/events/12/subscriptions/new
A UNILA é uma universidade Federal mantida pelo Brasil, com vocação integracionista e bilíngue, oferecendo metade das vagas para alunos brasileiros e metade para estrangeiros, oriundos da América Latina, em sua maioria da América do Sul. As vagas para professor são de livre concorrência tanto para brasileiros como para latino-americanos estrangeiros.
Começou ontem o ciclo de palestras “Revoluções Coloridas: Golpes do Século XXI?” promovido pelo Instituto Sul-Americano de Política e Estratégia (ISAPE) e pelo Núcleo Brasileiro de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais (NERINT-UFRGS).
No primeiro encontro, o prof. Nilo Piana de Castro e o prof. Dario Teixeira Ribeiro debateram as principais características que marcam os processos de mudanças políticas impulsionados pelos meios de comunicação e pela opinião pública. Para tanto, mostraram a evolução da publicidade e da propaganda como elementos fundamentais de sustentação e de mudanças políticas ao longo do século XX. Assim, as revoluções coloridas seriam caracterizadas pela condução de grupos estudantis, de organizações não-governamentais que se utilizam das ferramentas da imagem para cooptar a opinião pública e a partir disso iniciar um processo de mudança política. Outra característica básica seria a despolitização do movimento, a essência simplesmente moralista, com slogans fáceis (Contra corrupção, contra violência), sem a proposição de pautas construtivas.
Dessa forma, seriam movimentos que se diferem dos tradicionais golpes de estado ocorridos em meados do século XX, seja na América Latina, seja no Oriente Médio.
Hoje, serão discutidos os impactos desse fenômeno na Africa e Oriente Médio, processo que iniciou a partir da chamada primavera árabe, e na América Latina, quando governos tipicamente de esquerda, como o de Evo Morales e de Hugo Chavez, sofreram tentativas de golpe com forte apoio da opinião pública internacional e ONGs. Os palestrantes serão o prof. Dr. Paulo Fagundes Visentini (NERINT/PPGEEI/DERI-UFRGS) e o prof. Dr. Lucas Kerr de Oliveira (UNILA).
As inscrições podem ser feitas no local, e o investimento é de apenas R$ 20,00 por dia.
O ciclo continua na quarta-feira, quando serão debatidas as manifestações no Brasil, com o prof, Dr. José Miguel Quedi Martins (PPGEEI/DERI-UFRGS) e o prof. Dr. Luís Gustavo Grohmann (PPGPOL-UFRGS).
Ciclo de Palestras
” Revolução Coloridas: Golpes do Século XXI ? “
Datas: 14, 15 e 16 de outubro de 2013
Local: Auditório da FABICO (UFRGS)
Valor: R$ 40 todo o ciclo, ou R$ 20 cada encontro
14 de outubro segunda-feira 19h
Abertura: Revolução Coloridas: Golpes do Século XXI?
Prof.ª Dra. Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira (NERINT, DERI, PPGEEI/UFRGS)
Revoluções ou contra-revoluções coloridas? Papel dos meios de comunicação
Prof. Dr. Nilo Piana de Castro (Colégio Aplicação/UFRGS)
As Revoluções Coloridas no Espaço da ex-URSS e Leste-europeu
Prof. Dr. Luiz Dario Ribeiro Teixeira (NERINT, Depto História/UFRGS)
15 de outubro terça-feira 19h
Os impactos das Revoluções Coloridas no Oriente Médio e na África
Prof. Dr. Paulo F. G. Visentini (NERINT, DERI, PPGEEI/UFRGS)
Os impactos das Revoluções Coloridas na América Latina
Prof. Dr. Lucas Kerr Oliveira (Relações Internacionais e Integração/UNILA)
16 de outubro quarta-feira 19h
As revoluções coloridas no Brasil: Os impactos das Manifestações
Prof. Dr. José Miguel Quedi Martins (DERI, PPGEEI/UFRGS)
Prof. Dr. Luís Gustavo Grohmann (PPGPol/UFRGS)
Evento – IV Simpósio de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais do Programa San Tiago Dantas – UNESP, UNICAMP, PUC-SP
Mundorma – 05/08/2013 Coordenação
O IV Simpósio de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais “San Tiago Dantas” (UNESP, UNICAMP, PUC-SP) pretende reforçar o espaço aberto com êxito nas suas três primeiras edições como uma oportunidade de debate acadêmico de alcance nacional para discentes de pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais e áreas afins.Ademais, esta edição celebrará os 10 anos de funcionamento do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais “San Tiago Dantas” (UNESP, UNICAMP, PUC-SP), planejando um balanço intelectual da pós-graduação na área de Relações Internacionais no Brasil.
Linhas de pesquisa das Mesas Temáticas
I. Estudos de Paz, Defesa e Segurança Internacional
II. Estudos de Política Externa e Política Internacional
III. Economia Política Internacional e Integração Regional
IV. Estudos sobre os Estados Unidos da América
O evento terá lugar entre 05 e 08 de novembro de 2013, no Memorial da América Latina (Anexo dos Congressistas), em São Paulo – SP. Informações adicionais, como também a programação completa e a realização de inscrições podem ser feitas aqui.
Foreign Policy, May 13, 2013
Kenneth N. Waltz, 1924-2013
By Stephen M. Walt
I learned this morning that Kenneth N. Waltz, who was arguably the preeminent theorist of international relations of the postwar period, had passed away at the age of 88. Ken was the author of several enduring classics of the field, including Man, the State, and War(1959), Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics (1967), and Theory of International Politics (1979). His 1980 Adelphi Paper on nuclear proliferation (“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better”), was also a classic, albeit a controversial one. One of his lesser achievements was chairing my dissertation committee, and he was a source of inspiration throughout my career.
I’ve written a tribute to Waltz’s scholarship before, in the preface to a festschrift for Ken edited by Andrew Hanami. But today I want to celebrate his role as a teacher, based on some remarks I made at the 2010 meeting of the International Studies Association, where Waltz received an award for lifetime achievement. With a few edits, here’s what I said back then:
Ken Waltz is widely recognized as one of the preeminent IR scholars of the postwar period, but he was also responsible for training an impressive number of graduate students, including Barry Posen, Stephen Van Evera, Bob Powell, Avery Goldstein, Christopher Layne, Benny Miller, Karen Adams, Shibley Telhami, Jim Fearon, William Rose, Robert Gallucci, Andrew Hanami, and many others. I want to say a few words about what it was like to have him as a teacher and advisor, and why I think he was so effective at it.
First, Ken was trained in political theory and renowned as a theorist of international relations, but he was deeply interested in real-world issues and his example showed us how theory could be used to illuminate crucial policy issues. In addition to his own theoretical work, Ken wrote about Vietnam, nuclear strategy, economic interdependence and globalization, nuclear proliferation, the U.S. defense budget, and even the Rapid Deployment Force. For those of us who were interested in international security affairs, his model was wonderfully liberating. Ken showed that you could be a theorist and a social scientist without joining the “cult of irrelevance” that afflicts so much of academia.
Indeed, Ken’s work on these topics underscored why theory is so important. Having lots of facts at one’s disposal didn’t help if you were thinking about those facts in the wrong way. In a world where most people think theory and practice have little in common, Ken was teaching us that they were inextricably intertwined. That’s why he got a lot of things right that others got wrong. He was right about Vietnam, right about which side was winning the Cold War, right about the basic principles of nuclear deterrence, and right about the continued relevance of politics, even in the era of economic “globalization.” A little theory can go a long way, and his case, it led in the right direction.
Second, Ken encouraged his students to ask big questions, largely by the force of his own example. Man, the State, and War organizes and critiques several centuries of writing on the causes of war. Theory of International Politics presents a powerful general theory explaining the behavior of self-regarding actors in anarchy. His essay on proliferation attacks the conventional wisdom with ruthless logic, just as his earlier essays on interdependence showed where liberal theories had gone off-course and why power was still central. Ken encouraged us to tackle puzzles whose answers were not immediately available and to be fearless about challenging entrenched orthodoxies.
Third, and perhaps most important, Ken held the bar high and encouraged his students to have equally high standards. The first time I laid eyes on Ken was the orientation meeting for new grad students at Berkeley in 1977. Ken was director of graduate studies that year and had to give the welcoming speech. I don’t remember most of what he said, except that he emphasized that grad school took too damn long and that we should all plan on finishing in four years … or at most five. His message was simple: “Get your coursework done, write your MA paper, pass your qualifying exams … then write the thesis … four years! Why wait?” The average at Berkeley in those days was more like seven or eight years, so he was raising the bar from the very start.
I also remember my first day in Poli Sci 223, his graduate seminar in IR theory. I was already convinced that everyone else in the room knew more than I did, and Ken began by setting out his basic ideas about the field and about theory. At one point he made some critical remarks about two professors I had studied with as an undergraduate — nothing overly disparaging, just some critical comments on their conception of theory — which immediately made me think that not only did I know less than every one else in the room, everything I had learned up till then was wrong. The real lesson, however, was that grad school was not about learning what other people thought, it was about learning to think for yourself. And Ken gave us the freedom to do that. He never tried to force his students to agree with his views or to write books and articles designed to reinforce his own work or burnish his own reputation.
Fourth, Ken placed great value on writing well. His students are a diverse group — and certainly none of them are clones of Waltz himself — but all of them are very clear writers, regardless of which methods or approaches they use. Ken used to tell us to read Fowler’s Modern English Usage and Strunk and White’s Elements of Style, and he’d give little mini-lectures on his linguisic pet peeves in the middle of a seminar. In Waltz’s view, a scholar’s first duty is to make it easy for the reader to figure out what you were saying. If the reader is confused, that’s probably your fault.
This leads me to my most important encounter with him, which occurred as I was nearing the end of my dissertation. Writing a dissertation for Ken Waltz was intimidating from the start — remember, his dissertation was Man, the State, and War — and if you’d read that book and then read Theory of International Politics you knew you were dealing with someone with a razor-sharp ability to cut through a bloated argument and find the jugular. After two years of work I sent Ken the main analytical chapters of my thesis, and all I had left — or so I thought — was a short conclusion. Thinking I was nearly done, I accepted a post-doc for the following year.
And then I got a letter back from Ken, giving his comments on the chapters I had sent him earlier that month. His letter began by declaring that he had read the first twenty-five pages with “increasing dismay.” “They are terrible,” he wrote, and then went on: “Ask yourself why this is so. Were you trying to write too fast, or did you just not know what you were trying to say?” He continued in this vein for a few more paragraphs, making it clear that what I had sent was — to quote the letter again — “nowhere near ready to be an acceptable dissertation.” His bracing conclusion: “You have to face this squarely, and you are the only one who can fix these problems. So enjoy a busy summer.” By the way, there was little P.S. at the end, telling me that he thought it would be an excellent thesis once I had worked out the kinks.
I was basically curled up in a ball under my desk by the time I was finished reading this missive, and it was too early in the day to go for a stiff drink. I didn’t enjoy the experience very much at the time, and you might think he was being harsh or even cruel. In fact, Ken had done me an enormous service. He was telling me that there were no short-cuts if I wanted to make a serious scholarly contribution and reminding me that hasty or poorly thought-out work deserved to be treated harshly.
Looking back, I’m grateful that he didn’t spare my feelings, and there’s a lesson there for all of us. Professors aren’t really helping our students when we go easy on them, and students should in fact be grateful when their advisors occasionally take them to the woodshed.
So apart from his extraordinary scholarly achievements, Ken Waltz was also an inspiring and accomplished teacher. I was extraordinarily fortunate to have the opportunity to learn from him, and the study of international politics is much the richer for his remarkable contributions.
Addendum: All I would add to this today is the reminder of Waltz’s deep aversion to foolish military excesses. He served in the U.S. Army during the Korean War and was a realist rather than a pacifist. But like Hans Morgenthau, he was an early opponent of the Vietnam War and deeply skeptical of the paranoid threat-inflation that has informed so much of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Like many other realists, he also opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The field of international relations would be better off with more people like Ken, and the world would be better off if more great powers — especially the United States — paid more attention to his insights.
A Revista Acadêmica de Relações Internacionais (RARI), da UFSC, apresenta à comunidade acadêmica o presente Edital de convocação para alunos interessados em participarem do concurso de seleção de trabalhos para publicação em sua 3ª edição. A obra será publicada em formato eletrônico em Junho de 2013.
Os trabalhos deverão ser enviados até o dia 30 de abril de 2013, às 23:59 do horário de Brasília.
Os trabalhos devem ser enviados para o seguinte endereço eletrônico: firstname.lastname@example.org, até o dia 30 de Abril de 2013, às 23:59 do horário de Brasília.
Serão aceitos Artigos, Entrevistas, Resenhas, Resumos e Comunicações. Maiores informações disponíveis em http://rari.ufsc.br/
EDITAL DE SELEÇÃO DE ARTIGOS, RESENHAS, RESUMOS, ENTREVISTAS E COMUNICAÇÕES DA RARI
31/03/2013 – Lançamento de Chamada de Trabalhos
30/04/2013 – Prazo final para submissão de trabalhos
06/2013 – Publicação da 3ª Edição da RARI
Revista Acadêmica de Relações Internacionais (RARI) ISSN 2179-6165 – Periódico Quadrimestral de Relações Internacionais
Why Africa Is Turning to China
07 de janeiro de 2013 – All Africa
Ghana held its general elections on December 7 and 8, 2012, reelecting incumbent President John Dramani Mahama. However, Nana Akufo-Addo, flag-bearer of the opposition New Patriotic Party, is challenging Mahama’s narrow win and intends to contest the result in court, a legal process that is sure to be prolonged. The verdict could potentially challenge Ghana’s generally stable and peaceful political environment. What will not change are the country’s close economic ties to China.
On my trip to Ghana in 2011, I observed Chinese foremen at the construction sites of the now completed George W. Bush Highway. The massive Ministry of Defense building in Ghana’s capital, Accra, was constructed with a $50-million Chinese grant. The Bui Hydroelectric Dam is a collaborative project of the government of Ghana and Sino Hydro, a Chinese construction company. In 2012, China invested in a new Ghanaian airline that serves domestic routes, and it is likely that the China Airports Construction Corporation (CACC) will be involved in building Accra’s new international airport. (mais…)
New thrust to India-Australia relations
Asia Times – 23/10/2012 – por Sudhanshu Tripathi
The recent visit to India by Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard to India may prove a landmark achievement towards not only their mutual progress and prosperity but also for the peace and security of Asia. (mais…)
PATRIOTA – Mantemos relações corretas com o Irã
DefesaNET, da Zeho Hora / CAROLINA BAHIA E KLÉCIO SANTOS – 13/05/2012
Cai a tarde sobre Brasília e o chanceler Antonio Patriota acaba de retornar de uma reunião na Casa Civil onde foram discutidas questões de logística da conferência ambiental Rio+20.
O ministro pede desculpas pelo atraso, mas esbanja tranquilidade ao longo da entrevista concedida a ZH na última sexta-feira, em seu gabinete no Itamaraty. Sobre a mesa, esboços de rostos femininos feitos com esmero pelo próprio chanceler, fitas coloridas do Senhor do Bomfim e uma xícara de chá de hortelã que permanece intocada.
Patriota demonstra desconforto apenas com questões envolvendo as relações comerciais com a Argentina, porque entende que no campo da diplomacia não pode haver turbulências. Mantém a mesma postura ao ser indagado se está nervoso com a eleição na Venezuela.
– Diplomatas não ficam nervosos – sentencia.
A firmeza da resposta mostra um apego ferrenho às tradições do Itamaraty, fato que Patriota reafirma ao mostrar com orgulho a foto do Barão de Rio Branco, patrono da diplomacia brasileira. Formado em Filosofia em Genebra, o chanceler é um homem das artes. Toca piano à noite e lê vários livros ao mesmo tempo, embora agora esteja devorando um manuscrito inédito do livro Power Inc, do amigo jornalista David Rothkopf, editor da revista americana Foreign Policy, dedicada à análise das relações internacionais. (mais…)
v. 3, n. 9-10 (2012)
ANÁLISE DE CONJUNTURA
AS REFORMAS ECONÔMICAS E A SUCESSÃO POLÍTICA NA CORÉIA DO NORTE (p.4 –
Paulo Visentini, Helena Melchionna
A POLÍTICA DE INTEGRAÇÃO REGIONAL DA ARGENTINA NA ERA KIRCHNER (p.15 –
Marco Cepik, Natasha Pergher Silva
GOBERNANZA GLOBAL Y LAS NUEVAS FORMAS DE CONSTRUIR CONSENSOS MULTILATERALES
CHINA E ÍNDIA – EMERGÊNCIA E IMPACTO CULTURAL (p.52 – p.70)
Paulo Antônio Pereira Pinto
OS BRICS E A RECOMPOSIÇÃO DA ORDEM GLOBAL: ESTRATÉGIAS DE INSERÇÃO
INTERNACIONAL DAS POTÊNCIAS EMERGENTES (p.71 – p.89)
Hermes Moreira Jr.
A IMPORTANCIA DO NEOLIBERALISMO NA ENTRADA DO BRASIL NA OMC E NO
MULTILATERALISMO COMO NOVA POLÍTICA GOVERNAMENTAL (p.90 – p.113)
Jacqueline A. Haffner, Camila Feix Vidal
RESENHA DO LIVRO “SEGURANÇA INTERNACIONAL – PRÁTICAS, TENDÊNCIAS E
CONCEITOS” (p.114 – p.116)
Lucas Pereira Rezende
RESENHA DO LIVRO: “SISTEMA DECISÓRIO DA UNIÃO EUROPÉIA” (p.117 – p.119)
Clarissa Franzoi Dri
The Obama Doctrine: How the president’s drone war is backfiring
Foreign Policy / DAVID ROHDE – Março/Abril, 2012
When Barack Obama took the oath of office three years ago, no one associated the phrase “targeted killing” with his optimistic young presidency. In his inaugural address, the 47-year-old former constitutional law professor uttered the word “terror” only once. Instead, he promised to use technology to “harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories.”
Oddly, technology has enabled Obama to become something few expected: a president who has dramatically expanded the executive branch’s ability to wage high-tech clandestine war. With a determination that has surprised many, Obama has embraced the CIA, expanded its powers, and approved more targeted killings than any modern president. Over the last three years, the Obama administration has carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, more than five times the 44 approved under George W. Bush. And after promising to make counterterrorism operations more transparent and rein in executive power, Obama has arguably done the opposite, maintaining secrecy and expanding presidential authority.
Just as importantly, the administration’s excessive use of drone attacks undercuts one of its most laudable policies: a promising new post-9/11 approach to the use of lethal American force, one of multilateralism, transparency, and narrow focus.
Obama’s willingness to deploy lethal force should have come as no surprise. In a 2002 speech, Illinois state senator Obama opposed Bush’s impending invasion of Iraq, but not all conflicts. “I don’t oppose all wars,” he said. “What I am opposed to is a dumb war.” And as president, in his December 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Obama warned, “There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.” Since then, he has not only sent U.S. forces into Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, but also repeatedly approved commando raids in Pakistan and Somalia and on the high seas, while presiding over a system that unleashed hundreds of drone strikes.
In a series of recent interviews, current and former administration officials outlined what could be called an “Obama doctrine” on the use of force. Obama’s embrace of multilateralism, drone strikes, and a light U.S. military presence in Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen, they contend, has proved more effective than Bush’s go-heavy approach in Iraq and Afghanistan. “We will use force unilaterally if necessary against direct threats to the United States,” Ben Rhodes, the administration’s deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, told me. “And we’ll use force in a very precise way.”
Crises the administration deems indirect threats to the United States — such as the uprisings in Libya and Syria — are “threats to global security,” Rhodes argued, and will be responded to multilaterally and not necessarily by force. The drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the creation of a smaller, more agile U.S. military spread across Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East, are also part of the doctrine. So is the discreet backing of protesters in Egypt, Iran, and Syria.
The emerging strategy — which Rhodes touted as “a far more focused approach to our adversaries” — is a welcome shift from the martial policies and bellicose rhetoric of both the Bush administration and today’s Republican presidential candidates. But Obama has granted the CIA far too much leeway in carrying out drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. In both countries, the strikes often appear to be backfiring.
Obama and other administration officials insist the drones are used rarely and kill few civilians. In a rare public comment on the program, the president defended the strikes in late January. “I want to make sure the people understand, actually, drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties,” Obama said. “For the most part, they have been very precise precision strikes against al Qaeda and their affiliates. And we are very careful in terms of how it’s been applied.”
But from Pakistan to Yemen to post-American Iraq, drones often spark deep resentment where they operate. When they do attack, they kill as brutally as any weapon of war. The administration’s practice of classifying the strikes as secret only exacerbates local anger and suspicion. Under Obama, drone strikes have become too frequent, too unilateral, and too much associated with the heavy-handed use of American power.
In 2008, I saw this firsthand. Two Afghan colleagues and I were kidnapped by the Taliban and held captive in the tribal areas of Pakistan for seven months. From the ground, drones are terrifying weapons that can be heard circling overhead for hours at a time. They are a potent, unnerving symbol of unchecked American power. At the same time, they were clearly effective, killing foreign bomb-makers and preventing Taliban fighters from gathering in large groups. The experience left me convinced that drone strikes should be carried out — but very selectively.
In the January interview, Obama insisted drone strikes were used only surgically. “It is important for everybody to understand,” he said, “that this thing is kept on a very tight leash.”
Drones, though, are in no way surgical.
IN INTERVIEWS, CURRENT AND FORMER Obama administration officials told me the president and his senior aides had been eager from the outset to differentiate their approach in Pakistan and Afghanistan from Bush’s. Unlike in Iraq, where Democrats thought the Bush administration had been too aggressive, they thought the Bush White House had not been assertive enough with Afghan and Pakistani leaders. So the new administration adopted a unilateral, get-tough approach in South Asia that would eventually spread elsewhere. As candidate Obama vowed in a 2007 speech, referring to Pakistan’s president at the time, “If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.”
In his first year in office, Obama approved two large troop surges in Afghanistan and a vast expansion of the number of CIA operatives in Pakistan. The CIA was also given more leeway in carrying out drone strikes in the country’s ungoverned tribal areas, where foreign and local militants plot attacks for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond.
The decision reflected both Obama’s belief in the need to move aggressively in Pakistan and the influence of the CIA in the new administration. To a far greater extent than the Bush White House, Obama and his top aides relied on the CIA for its analysis of Pakistan, according to current and former senior administration officials. As a result, preserving the agency’s ability to carry out counterterrorism, or “CT,” operations in Pakistan became of paramount importance.
“The most important thing when it came to Pakistan was to be able to carry out drone strikes and nothing else,” said a former official who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The so-called strategic focus of the bilateral relationship was there solely to serve the CT approach.”
Initially, the CIA was right. Increased drone strikes in the tribal areas eliminated senior al Qaeda operatives in 2009. Then, in July 2010, Pakistanis working for the CIA pulled up behind a white Suzuki navigating the bustling streets of Peshawar. The car’s driver was later tracked to a large compound in the city of Abbottabad. On May 2, 2011, U.S. commandos killed Osama bin Laden there.
The U.S. intelligence presence, though, extended far beyond the hunt for bin Laden, according to former administration officials. At one point, the CIA tried to deploy hundreds of operatives across Pakistan but backed off after suspicious Pakistani officials declined to issue them visas. At the same time, the agency aggressively used the freer hand Obama had given it to launch more drone strikes than ever before.
Established by the Bush administration and Musharraf in 2004, the covert CIA drone program initially carried out only “personality” strikes against a preapproved list of senior al Qaeda members. Pakistani officials were notified before many, but not all, attacks. Between 2004 and 2007, nine such attacks were carried out in Pakistan, according to the New America Foundation.
In 2008, the Bush administration authorized less-restrictive “signature” strikes in the tribal areas. Instead of basing attacks on intelligence regarding a specific person, CIA drone operators could carry out strikes based on the behavior of people on the ground. Operators could launch a drone strike if they saw a group, for example, crossing back and forth over the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In 2008, the Bush administration carried out 33 strikes.
Under Obama, the drone campaign has escalated rapidly. The number of strikes nearly doubled to 53 in 2009 and then doubled again to 118 in 2010. Former administration officials said the looser rules resulted in the killing of more civilians. Current administration officials insisted that Obama, in fact, tightened the rules on the use of drone strikes after taking office. They said strikes rose under Obama because improved technology and intelligence gathering created more opportunities for attacks than existed under Bush.
But as Pakistani public anger over the spiraling strikes grew, other diplomats expressed concern as well. The U.S. ambassador in Pakistan at the time, Anne Patterson, opposed several attacks, but the CIA ignored her objections. When Cameron Munter replaced Patterson in October 2010, he objected even more vigorously. On at least two occasions, CIA Director Leon Panetta dismissed Munter’s protests and launched strikes, the Wall Street Journal later reported. One strike occurred only hours after Sen. John Kerry, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had completed a visit to Islamabad.
A March 2011 strike brought the debate to the White House. A day after Pakistani officials agreed to release CIA contractor Raymond Davis, the agency — again over Munter’s objections — carried out a signature drone strike that the Pakistanis say killed four Taliban fighters and 38 civilians. Already angry about the Davis case, Pakistan’s Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, issued an unusual public statement, saying a group of tribal elders had been “carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard to human life.” U.S. intelligence officials dismissed the Pakistani complaints and insisted 20 militants had perished. “There’s every indication that this was a group of terrorists, not a charity car wash in the Pakistani hinterlands,” one official told the Associated Press.
Surprised by the vehemence of the official Pakistani reaction, national security advisor Tom Donilon questioned whether signature strikes were worthwhile. Critics inside and outside the U.S. government contended that a program that began as a carefully focused effort to kill senior al Qaeda leaders had morphed into a bombing campaign against low-level Taliban fighters. Some outside analysts even argued that the administration had adopted a de facto “kill not capture” policy, given its inability to close Bush’s Guantánamo Bay prison and create a new detention system.
In April 2011, the director of Pakistan’s intelligence service, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, visited Washington in an effort to repair the relationship, according to news accounts and former administration officials. Just after his visit, two more drone strikes occurred in the tribal areas, which Pasha took as a personal affront. In a rare concession, Panetta agreed to notify Pakistan’s intelligence service before the United States carried out any strike that could kill more than 20 people.
In May, after the bin Laden raid sparked further anger among Pakistani officials, Donilon launched an internal review of how drone strikes were approved, according to a former administration official. But the strikes continued. At the end of May, State Department officials were angered when three missile strikes followed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Pakistan.
As Donilon’s review progressed, an intense debate erupted inside the administration over the signature strikes, according to the Journal. Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the strikes should be more selective. Robert Gates, then the defense secretary, warned that angry Pakistani officials could cut off supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Clinton warned that too many civilian casualties could strengthen opposition to Pakistan’s weak, pro-American president, Asif Ali Zardari.
The CIA countered that Taliban fighters were legitimate targets because they carried out cross-border attacks on U.S. forces, according to the former official. In June, Obama sided with the CIA. Panetta conceded that no drone strike would be carried out when Pakistani officials visited Washington and that Clinton and Munter could object to proposed strikes. But Obama allowed the CIA director to retain final say.
Last November, the worst-case scenario that Mullen, Gates, and Clinton had warned of came to pass. After NATO airstrikes mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Kayani demanded an end to all U.S. drone strikes and blocked supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. At the same time, popular opposition to Zardari soared. After a nearly two-month lull that allowed militants to regroup, drone strikes resumed in the tribal areas this past January. But signature strikes are no longer allowed — for the time being, according to the former senior official.
Among average Pakistanis, the strikes played out disastrously. In a 2011 Pew Research Center poll, 97 percent of Pakistani respondents who knew about the attacks said American drone strikes were a “bad thing.” Seventy-three percent of Pakistanis had an unfavorable view of the United States, a 10 percentage point rise from 2008. Administration officials say the strikes are popular with Pakistanis who live in the tribal areas and have tired of brutal jihadi rule. And they contend that Pakistani government officials — while publicly criticizing the attacks — agree in private that they help combat militancy. Making the strikes more transparent could reduce public anger in other parts of Pakistan, U.S. officials concede. But they say some elements of the Pakistani government continue to request that the strikes remain covert.
For me, the bottom line is that both governments’ approaches are failing. Pakistan’s economy is dismal. Its military continues to shelter Taliban fighters it sees as proxies to thwart Indian encroachment in Afghanistan. And the percentage of Pakistanis supporting the use of the Pakistani Army to fight extremists in the tribal areas — the key to eradicating militancy — dropped from a 53 percent majority in 2009 to 37 percent last year. Pakistan is more unstable today than it was when Obama took office.
A similar dynamic is creating even worse results on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. Long ignored by the United States, Yemen drew sudden attention after a suicide attack on the USS Cole killed 17 American sailors in the port of Aden in 2000. In 2002, the Bush administration carried out a single drone strike in Yemen that killed Abu Ali al-Harithi, an al Qaeda operative who was a key figure in orchestrating the Cole attack. In the years that followed, the administration shifted its attentions to Iraq, and militants began to regroup.
A failed December 2009 attempt by a militant trained in Yemen to detonate a bomb on a Detroit-bound airliner focused Obama’s attention on the country. Over the next two years, the United States carried out an estimated 20 airstrikes in Yemen, most in 2011. In addition to killing al Qaeda-linked militants, the strikes killed dozens of civilians, according to Yemenis. Instead of decimating the organization, the Obama strikes have increased the ranks of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from 300 fighters in 2009 to more than 1,000 today, according to Gregory Johnsen, a leading Yemen expert at Princeton University. In January, the group briefly seized control of Radda, a town only 100 miles from the capital, Sanaa. “I don’t believe that the U.S. has a Yemen policy,” Johnsen told me. “What the U.S. has is a counterterrorism strategy that it applies to Yemen.”
The deaths of bin Laden and many of his lieutenants are a step forward, but Pakistan and Yemen are increasingly unstable. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country of 180 million with resilient militant networks; Yemen, an impoverished, failing state that is fast becoming a new al Qaeda stronghold. “They think they’ve won because of this approach,” the former administration official said, referring to the administration’s drone-heavy strategy. “A lot of us think there is going to be a lot bigger problems in the future.”
THE BACKLASH FROM drone strikes in the countries where they are happening is not the only worry. In the United States, civil liberties and human rights groups are increasingly concerned with the breadth of powers Obama has claimed for the executive branch as he wages a new kind of war.
In the Libya conflict, the administration invoked the drones to create a new legal precedent. Under the War Powers Resolution, the president must receive congressional authorization for military operations within 60 days. When the deadline approached in May, the administration announced that because NATO strikes and drones were carrying out the bulk of the missions, no serious threat of U.S. casualties existed and no congressional authorization was needed. “It’s changed the way politicians talk about what should be the most important thing that a nation engages in,” said Peter W. Singer, a Brookings Institution researcher. “It’s changed the way we in the public deliberate war.”
Last fall, a series of drone strikes in Yemen set another dangerous precedent, according to civil liberties and human rights groups. Without any public legal proceeding, the U.S. government executed three of its own citizens. On Sept. 30, a drone strike killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a charismatic American-born cleric of Yemeni descent credited with inspiring terrorist attacks around the world. Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American jihadist traveling with him, was killed as well. Several weeks later, another strike killed Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, also a U.S. citizen. Administration officials insisted a Justice Department review had authorized the killings but declined to release the full document.
“The administration has claimed the power to carry out extrajudicial executions of Americans on the basis of evidence that is secret and is never seen by anyone,” said Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union. “It’s hard to understand how that is consistent with the Constitution.”
After criticizing the Bush administration for keeping the details of its surveillance, interrogation, and detention practices secret, Obama is doing the same thing. His administration has declined to reveal the details of how it places people on kill lists, carries out eavesdropping in the United States, or decides whom to detain overseas. The administration is also prosecuting six former government officials on charges of leaking classified information to the media — more cases than all other administrations combined.
Administration officials deny being secretive and insist they have disclosed more information about their counterterrorism practices than the Bush administration, which fiercely resisted releasing details of its “war on terror” and established the covert drone program in Pakistan. Obama administration officials say they have established a more transparent and flexible approach outside Pakistan that involves military raids, drone strikes, and other efforts. They told me that every attack in Yemen was approved by Yemeni officials. Eventually, they hope to make drone strikes joint efforts carried out openly with local governments.
For now, keeping them covert prevents American courts from reviewing their constitutionality, according to Jaffer. He pointed out that if a Republican president followed such policies, the outcry on the left would be deafening. “You have to remember that this authority is going to be used by the next administration and the next administration after that,” Jaffer said. “You need to make sure there are clear limits on what is really unparalleled power.”
TO THEIR CREDIT, Obama and his senior officials have successfully reframed Bush’s global battle as a more narrowly focused struggle against al Qaeda. They stopped using the term “war on terror” and instead described a campaign against a single, clearly identifiable group.
Senior administration officials cite the toppling of Muammar al-Qaddafi as the prime example of the success of their more focused, multilateral approach to the use of force. At a cost of zero American lives and $1 billion in U.S. funding, the Libya intervention removed an autocrat from power in five months. The occupation of Iraq claimed 4,484 American lives, cost at least $700 billion, and lasted nearly nine years.
“The light U.S. footprint had benefits beyond less U.S. lives and resources,” Rhodes told me. “We believe the Libyan revolution is viewed as more legitimate. The U.S. is more welcome. And there is less potential for an insurgency because there aren’t foreign forces present.”
In its most ambitious proposal, the administration is also trying to restructure the U.S. military, implement steep spending cuts, and “right-size” U.S. forces around the world. Under Obama’s plan, the Army would be trimmed by 80,000 soldiers, some U.S. units would be shifted from the Middle East to the Pacific, and more small, covert bases would be opened. Special Forces units that have been vastly expanded in Iraq and Afghanistan would train indigenous forces and carry out counterterrorism raids. Declaring al Qaeda nearly defeated, administration officials say it is time for a new focus.
“Where does the U.S. have a greater interest in 2020?” Rhodes asked. “Is it Asia-Pacific or Yemen? Obviously, the Asia-Pacific region is clearly going to be more important.”
Rhodes has a point, but Pakistan and its nuclear weapons — as well as Yemen and its proximity to vital oil reserves and sea lanes — are likely to haunt the United States for years.
Retired military officials warn that drones and commando raids are no substitute for the difficult process of helping local leaders marginalize militants. Missile strikes that kill members of al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan and Yemen do not strengthen economies, curb corruption, or improve government services. David Barno, a retired lieutenant general who commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, believes hunting down senior terrorists over and over again is not a long-term solution.
“How do you get beyond this attrition warfare?” he asked me. “I don’t think we’ve answered that question yet.”
Brazil’s New Swagger
Foreign Policy / David Rothkopf – 28/02/2012
While America’s halting path toward accepting the world’s new multipolar reality involves a step backward for every step forward, an exceptionalist violation of sovereignty for every bit of teamwork in places like Libya, other countries are actively working to establish new rules for all nations to follow in the new era.
Among those at the forefront of this effort are Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and her highly regarded foreign minister, Antonio Patriota. He was in New York last week to advance this effort at the United Nations, and we sat down for lunch together.
The challenge facing Rousseff and Patriota as public servants is a daunting one. Each follows in the footsteps of a formidable predecessor. Admittedly, Rousseff’s challenge is much greater and indeed, to many, seems almost insurmountable. She succeeds two presidents who were arguably the most important in her country’s modern history, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who is credited with stabilizing the country’s economy after years of volatility, and her immediate predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, not only her mentor but one of a tiny handful of the world’s most important leaders of the past decade. But Patriota’s predecessor, Celso Amorim, was also formidable, extremely influential, and a fixture on the Brazilian and international scenes. The bar was set high for her entire administration. (mais…)
Obama pinches China over human rights
Russia Today – 14/02/2012
US President Barack Obama warmly welcomed Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to the Oval Office on Tuesday. But etiquette did not keep him from raising a sensitive human rights issue with the Chinese leader-in-waiting.
Obama said Washington would “continue to emphasize what we believe is the importance of realizing the aspirations and rights of all people.”
Human rights is not the only stumbling block in the relationship between the US and China. The two countries disagree on various policy questions including Syria, Iran and the global economy. However, both Obama and Xi spoke about their cooperative partnership and trust.
“We want to work with China to make sure that everybody is working by the same rules of the road when it comes to the world economic system,” Obama said.
He also said that Washington praises China’s “extraordinary development over the last two decades” but noted that with such power comes “increased responsibilities.” (mais…)
American Decline in Perspective
TomDispatch / Noam Chomsky – 14/02/2012
Part 1: “Losing” the World
Significant anniversaries are solemnly commemorated — Japan’s attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, for example. Others are ignored, and we can often learn valuable lessons from them about what is likely to lie ahead. Right now, in fact.
At the moment, we are failing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of President John F. Kennedy’s decision to launch the most destructive and murderous act of aggression of the post-World War II period: the invasion of South Vietnam, later all of Indochina, leaving millions dead and four countries devastated, with casualties still mounting from the long-term effects of drenching South Vietnam with some of the most lethal carcinogens known, undertaken to destroy ground cover and food crops.
The prime target was South Vietnam. The aggression later spread to the North, then to the remote peasant society of northern Laos, and finally to rural Cambodia, which was bombed at the stunning level of all allied air operations in the Pacific region during World War II, including the two atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In this, Henry Kissinger’s orders were being carried out — “anything that flies on anything that moves” — a call for genocide that is rare in the historical record. Little of this is remembered. Most was scarcely known beyond narrow circles of activists.
When the invasion was launched 50 years ago, concern was so slight that there were few efforts at justification, hardly more than the president’s impassioned plea that “we are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence” and if the conspiracy achieves its ends in Laos and Vietnam, “the gates will be opened wide.”
Elsewhere, he warned further that “the complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history [and] only the strong… can possibly survive,” in this case reflecting on the failure of U.S. aggression and terror to crush Cuban independence. (mais…)
‘Drones multiply militants’ – Pakistani FM
Russia Today – 09/02/2012
American drones hitting targets on Pakistani territory is illegal, and involvement of the Pakistani spy agencies with Taliban not even worthy of comment, said Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, exclusive to RT.
Attacks by US drones on Pakistani territory are illegal and cannot be tolerated, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar told RT. In a recent development, a US drone strike killed three suspected militants in the Pakistani northwest tribal region, AP news agency reports on Thursday. On Wednesday nine people were killed in another attack, including some Taliban fighters. These follow tensions between the Pakistani government and the US administration over American air strikes last year that accidentally killed 24 Pakistani troops.
According to the minister, the US attacks promote extremist moods in the region.
“Drones are not only completely illegal and unlawful and have no authorization to be used within the domains of international law but even more importantly, they are counter-productive to the objective of getting this region rid of militancy, and terrorism and extremism,” Hina Rabbani Khar said. “Because if one strike leads to getting you target number one or target number three today, you are creating five more targets or 10 more targets in the militancy that it breeds, in the fodder that it gives to the militants to attract more people to join their ranks.” (mais…)
Iran’s Deterrence Strategy in the Strait of Hormuz
Stratfor – 09/02/2012
Iranian naval exercises scheduled for February underscore a strategy that is both political and military: To deter an attack, Iran must enhance the perception that it possesses the strength to attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz. And it needs to continually refine its own tactics, capabilities, and command and control processes in order to maintain that perception. However, the exercises carry the risk of exposing operational weaknesses, and ongoing tensions mean a misstep could escalate into conflict.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is slated to conduct naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz later this month as part of the seventh “Great Prophet” exercise, the latest in a series of exercises dating back to 2006. The IRGC has already begun ground maneuvers (Hamiyan-e Velayathave) further inland. This year opened with the end of the Velayat-90 naval exercises, followed by ground maneuvers conducted near the Afghan border (Shohaday-e Vahdat).
Each exercise highlights Iran’s need to heighten the credibility of its military capabilities. A strong perception that Iran could not only initiate but sustain action in the Strait of Hormuz strengthens the credibility of its deterrent against U.S. military action. But with U.S. warships located in the Persian Gulf and the wider region, Iran must boost such perceptions carefully to avoid revealing operational vulnerabilities or sparking an unintended escalation.
The Great Prophet exercises are led by the more ideologically committed IRGC, which has been involved in some of Iran’s most aggressive recent behavior — its gunboats harassed the USS Hopper (DDG 70), USS Port Royal (CG 73) and USS Ingraham (FFG 61) while transiting the strait in January 2008 — and some of the most overtly staged displays of military power. (mais…)
Conservadores britânicos sugerem que o Brasil não pode ser amigo de todos no mundo
Correio do Brasil – 08/02/2012
O jornal conservador britânico Financial Times banca a afirmativa, em sua edição desta quarta-feira, que, prestes a se tornar potência global, o Brasil não poderá mais “ser amigo de todos”, especialmente como no período da Guerra Fria, no qual o país teria assumido uma posição neutra, segundo a publicação. O jornal dedica meia página a um texto sobre a blogueira cubana Yoani Sánchez, recém-contratada pelo Instituto Millenium, braço da ultradireita brasileira, a quem rotula como principal voz da oposição ao regime comunista cubano, e faz alegações sobre o papel do Brasil na recente tentativa da autora do blog Generation Y de deixar a ilha para uma visita ao Brasil.
Escrevendo de São Paulo, o colunista Joe Leahy, do FT, usa o episódio para comparar a política a externa do governo Dilma Rousseff em relação a seu antecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
Sob o título “Política externa do Brasil não pode ficar para sempre em cima do muro”, Leahy lembra que, ao ser cobrada por ativistas cubanos para que se manifestasse sobre Direitos Humanos em Cuba, em sua primeira visita como presidente ao país, Dilma Roussef preferiu “apontar o dedo para os Estados Unidos”. Na época, Dilma afirmou que todos os países têm telhado de vidro no tema direitos humanos e citou a Base de Guantánamo, que causa constrangimentos ao governo norte-americano. (mais…)
Russia, China lose credit in Arab world: League chief
Reuters / Paul Ingrassia, Edmund Blair – 06/02/2012
The Arab League chief said on Monday that Russia and China had lost diplomatic credit in the Arab world by vetoing a U.N. resolution on Syria and may have sent a message to Damascus that it had a free hand to crack down on protests.
But Nabil Elaraby said he would continue working with Moscow and Beijing and other U.N. Security Council members to end the violence that spiked on Monday with the bombardment of the Syrian city of Homs, which activists said killed 50 people.
Elaraby told Reuters the veto had been a “reality check” for Syria’s opposition groups, who have so far refused the League’s call to engage with President Bashar al-Assad’s government, showing them that it was not Arabs blocking tougher action on Damascus but rather world powers who were not united.
“Regrettably, the Russians and Chinese delegations decided at the last moment to use the veto and here I must say, this question of the veto, whether used by Russia or any other country, is something unacceptable,” the secretary-general said in an interview at the League’s Cairo headquarters.
“I’m not blaming them but the Syrian opposition was under an illusion that the Arab League was standing between them and the solution – the solution is the Libyan scenario. But the Libyan scenario is out of the picture,” he said.
During the Libyan uprising, Arabs backed a no-fly zone over Libya that led to a U.N. resolution and then NATO air strikes. Arabs and world powers have ruled out military action on Syria. (mais…)